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I. INTRODUCTION

When Cristian Fernandez was two-years-old, he was found naked and
alone on a dark Miami street, while his grandmother was "holed up with
cocaine in a messy motel room."' When Cristian was twelve-years-old,
school officials sent him to have an eye injury examined, and police visited
his home to investigate claims that his stepfather had caused the injuries.2
When the officers arrived, they found the stepfather dead from a selfinflicted gunshot wound.3
The Fernandez family later moved to
Jacksonville, where Cristian excelled in his sixth grade classes.4 Just
months later, in March 2011, Cristian was accused of killing his two-yearold brother after he slammed his brother's head against a bookshelf.5 In

1. See Tamara Lush, Police: Florida Teen Killed 2-Year-Old Brother, USA
TODAY (Sept. 16, 2012) (noting that the boy's fourteen-year-old mother was absent).
2. See Jeff Brumley, Father, Former Neighbors Stunned by Murder Charge
Against Cristian Fernandez, FLA. TIMEs-UNION (June 11, 2011) (conveying that

Cristian had told officers that his step-father punched him in the face).
3. See id. (reporting that the step-father shot and killed himself in front of his
family to avoid arrest for child abuse).
4. See id. (noting that neighbors saw Cristian by himself, shortly after the
stepfather's death, removing all of the family's belongings from their apartment in
white garbage bags); see also Lush, supra note 1 (remarking that Cristian had straight
As in the sixth grade).
5. See Bridget Murphy, Cristian Fernandez Case: As Someone Surfed Internet,
Tot's Life Was Slipping Away, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Sept. 14, 2012) (explaining that
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December 2011, Cristian was charged as an adult with first-degree murder
and was facing a life sentence in prison.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Miller v. Alabama precludes
Cristian from receiving a mandatory life-without-parole (LWOP) sentence,
but the particulars of his case illustrate the importance of the Miller holding
and the range of consequences involved in the different interpretations of
the decision.7 In Miller, the Court held that judges must consider a juvenile
offender's age, background, and the circumstances of his crime instead of
imposing mandatory LWOP sentences.8 If Cristian's background is not
considered, as Miller requires in mandatory LWOP cases, then the judge or
jury will not have explored the penological justifications for his sentence
and will fail to draw from the background of an offender's upbringing that
may have heavily impacted the youth's culpability.9
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Miller v.
Alabama applies to juvenile sentencing in all states, not just those that
previously had mandatory LWOP sentencing schemes for juveniles. Part II
of this Comment examines the Court's recent forays into the juvenile
justice system and will contextualize the emerging analyses on the
relationship between adolescent development and criminal culpability. 0
Cristian was accused of slamming his brother's head into a bookshelf when their
mother was not home).
6. See David Hunt, Jacksonville 12-Year-Old Charged With First-DegreeMurder
of Brother, FLA. TIMES-UNION (June 2, 2011) (noting that Cristian is the youngest

person charged with a homicide in Jacksonville's history).
7. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (holding that the Eighth
Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandatorily sentences a juvenile to lifewithout-parole); see also How Should the Law Respond to Those Who Kill Before They
17, 2012, 8:47 AM),
Are Teenagers?, SEN'G L. & POL'Y (Sept.

http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_1awand policy/2012/09/how-should-thelaw-respond-to-those-who-kill-before-they-are-teenagers.html (noting that although the
case's prosecutor said she would seek a plea agreement and not pursue a life sentence,
if no deal is made, Cristian could face a mandatory life sentence under the current
structure).
8. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (identifying as noteworthy the abuse one
defendant suffered from his step-father and the defendant's subsequent multiple suicide
attempts).
9. See Daugherty v. State, 96 So. 3d 1076, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(asserting that even though the juvenile offender's LWOP sentence was not mandatory,
the circumstances of his crime and his personal background should be examined in
accordance with Miller). In February of 2013, Cristian Fernandez accepted a plea
agreement and pled guilty as a juvenile to manslaughter and aggravated battery. See
also Jim Schoettler, CristianFernandez Pleads Guilty to Manslaughter, Gets Juvenile
Sanctions, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Feb. 8,2013).

10. See infra Part II (recounting the basis for the recent Supreme Court decisions
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Part III argues that if courts do not interpret Miller expansively, juvenile
LWOP punishments will still be possible under various sentencing
schemes." Part III uses an Eighth Amendment analysis to determine
whether a strict interpretation of Miller would result in unconstitutional
punishments.12 Under this analysis, a national consensus and Supreme
Court precedent require a broad interpretation of Miller to apply to all
juvenile LWOP sentences.' 3 Part IV recommends that states end their
practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to multiple mandatory sentences
in which the term of years approaches the juvenile's life expectancy.14 Part
V concludes that any punishment that is functionally a life sentence
imposed mandatorily on a juvenile offender is a violation of Miller.'5
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview ofRecent Developments in Juvenile Sentencing
The 2002 case of Atkins v. Virginia provided a basis for future decisions
involving the culpability of juveniles.' 6 In Atkins, the Court found
executions of mentally retarded offenders to be a violation of the Eighth
Amendment.' 7 The Court reached its decision after assessing whether the
execution of mentally retarded offenders conforms with the evolving
In
standards of decency relating to the context of the punishment."
that have shaped the present understanding of juvenile culpability).
11. See infra Part III (demonstrating the impact a limited interpretation of Miller
will have on actual practices that mandate LWOP sentences for juveniles).
12. See infra Part III (assessing the importance of the main principles used by the
Court in its recent decisions on juvenile sentencing).
13. See infra Part III (reasoning that the Court's penological justifications outweigh
any specific and narrow interpretation of the Miller holding).

14. See infra Part IV (arguing that this practice fails to consider Miller's
prohibition against disproportionate sentences that do not allow the offenders an

opportunity at life outside prison).
15. See infra Part V (recounting the ways in which a mandatorily-imposed
functional-life sentence violates the principles upon which Miller was based).
16. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (prohibiting less culpable
offenders from receiving excessive punishments).
17. See id. at 311-12 (explaining that standards of decency had evolved toward a
consensus that such a punishment was excessive).
18. See id. (describing the process of assessing the objective indicia of society to
satisfy the evolving standards of decency test); see also Juvenile Justice Ctr., Am. Bar
Jan.
2004,
Standards
of
Decency,
Ass'n,
Evolving
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminaljustice section new
the
(synthesizing
sletter/crimjustjuvjusEvolvingStandards.authcheckdam.pdf
framework necessary to test whether the standards of decency have sufficiently
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looking at the national consensus concerning the punishment of mentally
retarded criminals, the Court noted that there was a widespread sentiment
that such offenders are categorically less culpable than the average criminal
offender.19 The majority in Atkins also noted that defendants with reduced
capacity often face certain challenges with the judicial process.20
The Court relied on similar arguments when deciding the 2005 case
Roper v. Simmons, which followed a logic derived from Trop v. Dulles.2 1
In 1958, the Trop majority outlined the importance of using an Eighth
Amendment analysis to assess punishment against the standards of a
civilized society.22 In Roper, the Court held that the death penalty could
not be imposed on offenders who were minors when they committed their
23
crime. The Court previously ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
the imposition of the death penalty on offenders younger than sixteen years
old, after it found that the standards of decency had evolved to reject such a
punishment.2 4 In Roper, the majority argued that a national consensus
developed, favoring greater consideration for the mental capacity of
juvenile offenders.2 5 In reaching its decision, the Court contemplated the
merits of such a punishment under the Eighth Amendment.26 In measuring
whether the standards of decency had evolved, the Court looked to both

evolved).
19. See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-15 (deriving this position from the number of states
that had enacted legislation exempting mentally retarded offenders from the death
penalty).

20. See id. at 320 (explaining that a mentally retarded defendant could have
difficulty giving assistance to her legal counsel and may be more likely to confess
falsely).
21. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (reaching its decision to
exempt juveniles from the death penalty after using the Trop test to find the penalty
unconstitutional for minors).
22. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (characterizing the Eighth
Amendment as requiring flexibility for societal standards).
23. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 558, 560 (holding that the imposition of the death
penalty on juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment).
24. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 829 (1988) (noting the
standards of decency arose from the fact that, of states that specified a minimum age
for the death penalty, each of those states set the minimum age at sixteen).
25. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65 (devising a national consensus against the
juvenile death penalty because only three states had executed a juvenile offender in the
previous ten years).
26. See id. at 560 (explaining an assessment of the Eighth Amendment must focus
on the evolving standards of decency test articulated in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958)).
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legislative enactments and state practices.2 7 The Court took various
characteristics of youth into account as well, explaining that because
juveniles are so susceptible to negative influences in their surroundings,
their diminished culpability should be factored into their sentencing.28 The
Court distinguished juvenile sentencing from adult sentencing by factoring
in the greater likelihood that a minor's character deficiencies could be
reformed.29
In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that juveniles convicted of nonhomicidal crimes could not receive an LWOP sentence, thereby furthering
the approach that the Eighth Amendment demands consideration of the
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders. 30 The Court arrived at this
decision by first determining whether there was a national consensus
against the sentencing practice; it also used its own judgment to assess
whether the punishment was constitutional. 3 1 The Court's analysis of the
standards of decency focused on the rareness of instances in which a
juvenile was sentenced to LWOP for a non-homicidal crime.3 2 The Court
then turned to its independent judgment to evaluate the diminished
culpability of juvenile offenders.
The majority settled on a
proportionality analysis, assessing the harshness of the penalty, as well as
measuring the sentences imposed for other criminals in other
jurisdictions.34 The Court included the offender's age in this analysis.35
27. See id. at 565 (framing the national consensus based on the fact that only three
states had executed a juvenile offender in the previous ten years).

28. See id. at 569-70 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492
U.S. 361, 395 (1989)) (distinguishing adult culpability from that of juveniles because
the Court argues that the difficult environments of juveniles may give them a greater
claim than adults to be forgiven).
29. See id. at 570 (asserting that it would be a moral error to equate the failings of a
minor with those of an adult).
30. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2016 (2010) (reasoning that a juvenile
offender who did not kill has a twice diminished moral culpability compared to an adult
murderer because of the offender's age and the nature of the crime).
31. See id. at 2015 (noting that such a two-prong analysis is proper for all Eighth
Amendment cases involving categorical rules).
32. See id. at 2024 (explaining that a national consensus against sentencing
juveniles to LWOP for non-homicidal crimes existed because only eleven states had
done so).
33. See id. at 2026 (asserting that the Court had the right and responsibility to
interpret the Eighth Amendment independently).
34. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1005 (1991) (describing the test as
examining the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the offender).
35. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2031 (explaining that a failure to consider the
defendant's youth distorts the proportionality analysis).
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Yet, because the Court's decision was also aimed at eradicating certain
prejudices and difficulties juveniles face in the adult court system, the
Court determined that a categorical rule exempting juvenile offenders from
a certain punishment would avoid the risk that a court would incorrectly
find a juvenile to be "sufficiently culpable." 36 The risk that a juvenile's
culpability would not be properly considered, combined with the inherent
severity of an LWOP sentence for a juvenile offender, makes such a
sentence "cruel and unusual punishment."3 7 The Court's use of a
categorical ban on a specific punishment to distinguish juveniles from
adults marked the first time the Court excluded a class of offenders from a
non-capital punishment.3 8 The Court's further shift towards distinguishing
the culpability of a juvenile offender from that of an adult represented the
Court's increasing interest in incorporating psychological differences
between the two classes into constitutional analyses.
B. Miller v. Alabama
On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Miller v.
Alabama, holding that juvenile offenders cannot be sentenced to mandatory
life imprisonment without parole. 4 0 The decision was based on a national
consensus representing an evolving standard of decency, notwithstanding
the fact that the majority of states enforced a mandatory LWOP term for
juveniles convicted as adults for murder. 4 1 The Court was careful to
distinguish its analytical framework here from that in Roper and Graham
by pointing out that this decision was not a categorical ban on juvenile

36. Compare Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (discussing the difficulties juveniles have
in working with their lawyers, based on a mistrust of the institutional actors in the
system), with Kristin Henning, Juvenile Justice After Graham v. Florida: Keeping Due
Process, Autonomy, and Paternalismin Balance, 38 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 17, 49

(2012) (explaining that deficiencies in the attorney-child relationship can be traced to
inadequate lawyering and limited resources, and not only immaturity).
37. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-30 (characterizing the longer LWOP sentences
juveniles face as unconstitutional because these sentences will not satisfy the
penological goals).
38. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that such a class exemption had
only been employed for death penalty cases).
39. See id. at 2026 (citing Roper as precedent for the less-developed juvenile mind
to correlate to a diminished level of criminal culpability).
40. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458 (2012) (contending that Graham
did not go far enough in distinguishing youth and adult crimes).
41. See id. at 2471 (noting that the Graham holding was sufficient to warrant this
decision, and that Miller was different from others where legislative enactments
suggested a national consensus).
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LWOP.4 2 Whereas the Court rested on its own judgment in the previous
juvenile culpability cases, in Miller it heavily relied on its own precedent.43
In a consolidated decision, the Court in Miller considered mandatory
LWOP sentences imposed on Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller.4 Jackson,
then fourteen-years-old, took part in an armed robbery of a video store in
which another boy shot and killed a store clerk.4 5 An Arkansas prosecutor
charged Jackson as an adult with capital felony murder and aggravated
robbery, and a jury convicted him of both charges.46 In Miller, Miller and a
friend drank alcohol and smoked marijuana with a neighbor before the boys
stole money from the neighbor's wallet after the neighbor passed out. 4 7
The neighbor awoke and grabbed Miller by the throat, but Miller's friend
was able to free him.48 Miller then grabbed a baseball bat and beat the
neighbor repeatedly with it before the two boys lit the neighbor's trailer
home on fire. 4 9 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, citing Miller's
"mental maturity," affirmed the transfer of the case to adult court where

Miller was convicted of murder in the course of arson, a crime carrying a
mandatory minimum punishment of life in prison.50
Just as the Court had done in Roper and Graham, the majority in Miller
articulated an evolving standard of decency by referencing a national
consensus.51 The Court then turned to precedent, looking at cases in which
culpability correlated with the severity of a penalty and cases prohibiting
the mandatory imposition of the death penalty.52 The Miller holding,
42. See id. (explaining that this holding only required courts to follow a certain
process rather than strictly forbidding a punishment for a specific class).
43. See id. (differentiating the Miller analysis from that used in Roper and Graham
because of an emphasis on the youthful characteristics articulated in preceding cases).
44. See id. at 2461-63 (describing the extent and makeup of the punishments in
each case).
45. See id. at 2461 (noting that it was not until Jackson was en route to the store
that he learned another boy was carrying a sawed-off shotgun).
46. See id. (noting that the mandatory minimum punishment for the capital felony
murder charge was LWOP).
47. See id. at 2462 (noting that Miller was a regular user of drugs and alcohol and
had attempted suicide on four occasions).
48. See id. (describing how the friend used a bat to free Miller from the chokehold).
49. See id. (stating the neighbor died from his injuries and smoke inhalation).
50. Id. at 2462-63.
51. See id. at 2470-71 (arguing that even though twenty-nine jurisdictions required
mandatory LWOP terms for juveniles convicted of murder as an adult, when given the
choice, sentencing officials rarely imposed the penalty).
52. See id. at 2463-64 (contending that the confluence of these two strands of
precedent structured the justification for a ban of mandatory juvenile LWOP).
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which prohibited mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences, served as an
extension of the recent Supreme Court decisions that distinguished the
diminished culpability of juveniles to categorically exempt minors from
certain punishments.
In going further than the Roper and Graham
decisions to prohibit all mandatory sentencing schemes that punish
juveniles with LWOP sentences, the majority in Miller focused on the
psychological features of adolescence and importance of closely examining
the circumstances of a juvenile offender's crime.54
The Miller Court's focus on the disproportionate nature of juvenile
sentencing in adult courts served as the foundation of its Eighth
Amendment argument.
The Miller Court cited data provided by the
Human Rights Watch showing that, of the sixteen states that required
discretion when sentencing juveniles to LWOP, the average state had
sentenced only seventeen minors to life without parole. 6 The Court
singled out mandatory LWOP sentences because of the disproportionate
nature of mandatory sentences that do not consider an offender's legitimate
culpability and merely extend to the strict definition of the crime.57 Yet
where Graham categorically prohibited the imposition of a specific
punishment on juveniles, Miller only requires that courts first consider the
offender's youth and personal circumstances before sentencing." This is
based on the Court's recent conclusions that children should be
distinguished from adults for the purpose of sentencing and should, thus, be
exempted from the most severe punishments in most cases. 59

53. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (holding that the sentencing
of juveniles to the death penalty was unconstitutional); see also Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (holding that juveniles could not be sentenced to LWOP for nonhomicide crimes).
54. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (asserting that mandatory sentences for juveniles
fail to consider the offender's age, and factors associated with that age, such as
immaturity and failure to appreciate risks and consequences).
55. See id at 2458 (holding that a failure to consider a juvenile offender's youth
would deprive the sentencing official of the opportunity to consider whether the
sentence is proportional to the offender's culpability).
56. See State Distributionof Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole
2009),
2,
(Oct.
WATCH
RIGHTS
HUMAN
(JLWOP),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/state-distribution-juvenile-offenders-servingjuvenile-life-without-parole (demonstrating that courts were not especially willing to
lock up juveniles for life in discretionary sentencing systems).
57. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (noting that the likelihood of imposing a
disproportionate punishment is higher when youth is not considered).
58. See id at 2471 (holding that the sentencing official must follow a certain
process before imposing an LWOP sentence on juvenile offenders).
59. See id. at 2464 (recounting Roper's reliance on the adolescent's lack of
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C. The Aftermath of Miller

It is unclear how the states will apply and interpret the Miller decision.60
Among the main issues that states must resolve is whether all situations in
which a juvenile is mandatorily sentenced to life can stand under Miller
and whether non-traditional life sentences derived from multiple
convictions can be upheld under Miller.6 1 Though the Court did not clearly
establish a tangible measurement to use when determining whether a
lengthy sentence can be considered a life sentence, Miller has encouraged
many to ask whether a term that approaches life can be classified as a life
sentence.6 2
1. A Narrow Interpretationof Miller Will Continue to Allow the Mandatory
Imposition ofLife- Without-ParoleSentences on Juveniles as Long as the
Punishment Is Portrayedin a QuantifiableSet of Years.

Sentencing schemes that compound separate mandatory punishments to
create a functional-LWOP sentence could also bypass the Miller holding. 63
In the immediate aftermath of the Miller decision, the Sixth Circuit held
that an eighty-nine-year sentence created from multiple convictions was not
the same as a life sentence for purposes of requiring consideration of a
juvenile offender's age and mitigating factors of youth.6 In reaching its
decision, the Circuit prioritized the Miller Court's focus on singleconviction sentencing practices to conclude that the Court did not intend
for the punishment to apply to all forms of LWOP sentences.6 5
In State v. Solis-Diaz, a Washington teenager was convicted of several

maturity, vulnerability to outside forces, and "less-fixed" personal character).
60. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile Life- Without-Parole Case
Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 8, 2012, 8:30
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky (examining whether the
Miller decision was meant merely to implement a new procedural rule).
61. E.g., Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 971 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (reasoning
that Miller should not apply to cases that do not involve an LWOP single sentence).
62. See Maggie Lee & Oliver Ortega, Juvenile Offenders in Limbo under Outdated
State Laws, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Sept. 25, 2012), http://jjie.org/juvenileoffenders-limbo-under-outdated-state-laws/94610 (explaining the situations that can
arise in which a lengthy-sentence forms from a combination of several counts
warranting mandatory punishments).
63. E.g., Walle, 99 So. 3d at 973 (holding that the compound ninety-two year
sentence imposed on a teenage offender was not a violation of Graham or Miller).
64. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (regarding consecutive
fixed-term sentences as being outside the scope of the Miller decision).
65. See id. (assessing the Graham Court's national consensus analysis as narrowly
interpreting the Roper decision).
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counts tracing to a shooting that did not kill or injure anyone, yet his
sentence totaled more than ninety-two years.66 Although, before Miller,
Washington was one of the states that mandated LWOP sentences for firstdegree murder, it is conceivable that a punishment resembling that in SolisDiaz could occur in other states. In a recent Florida case, Walle v. State, a
defendant was sentenced to a total of ninety-two years in prison after being
A
convicted of eighteen offenses he committed as a thirteen-year-old.
Florida appeals court declined to extend Graham and Miller to overturn
this defendant's sentence because that court believed that the Supreme
Court was not referring to sentences derived from several separate
convictions, and the multi-jurisdictional nature of this compounded
sentence distinguished it from Graham and Miller.6 9
2. If States Do Not Give ProperDeference to Miller, States Will Seek to
Inhibit Miller's IndividualizedSentencing Requirement.
Courts have considered the extent to which Miller requires
individualized hearings that consider the juvenile offender's age and
accompanying circumstances in two recent cases. 70 In People v. Caballero,
the California Supreme Court applied the reasoning employed in Graham
and Miller to overturn a 110-year sentence. 7 1 Because the lengthy sentence
assigned to the juvenile offender in Caballero was not mandatorilyimposed, Miller did not strictly require the court to provide the offender
with an opportunity for an eventual parole hearing.72 California did not
66. See State v. Solis-Diaz, No. 37120-1-II, 2009 WL 3261249, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct.

App. Oct. 13, 2009) (conveying that the defendant's ninety-two year sentence was
derived from six counts of first degree assault, as well charges for drive-by shooting
and unlawful possession of a firearm).
67. See Brief of Respondent, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 109646), 2012 WL 588454 at *18 (including Washington in its recitation of states that
permitted such a punishment).
68. See Walle, 99 So. 3d at 968 (noting that the punishments consisted of sentences
imposed by different judges from different jurisdictions for some of the crimes).
69. See id at 971 (holding that the court was unable to expand beyond the Graham
court's holding which applied solely to a single-sentence).
70. See Daugherty v. State, 96 So. 3d 1076, 1079 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012)
(proclaiming that under Miller a juvenile offender's age and personal circumstances
should be considered even in cases that were not mandatory LWOP); People v.
Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (framing a 110-year sentence as a functional
life sentence).
71. See Caballero,282 P.3d at 295 (holding that a juvenile could not be punished
with what amounted to a mandatory de-facto life sentence).
72. See id. at 293 (explaining that the 110-year sentence was effectively mandatory
because it consisted of five separately-mandated sentences deriving from each count in
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previously sanction mandatory LWOP for juvenile offenders, as the state
allowed such a sentence but strictly on a discretionary basis.73
In reversing a juvenile LWOP sentence that was imposed discretionally,
a Florida appeals court implemented Miller's reasoning that children
should be examined differently and that the attributes of youth should be
scrutinized at sentencing.74 Daugherty represents a significant extension of
Miller because it applies Miller's consideration of the mitigating factors of
youth to an LWOP sentence that was nonetheless imposed even after the
trial court noted the juvenile offender's background.
In People v. Hoffman, the California Court of Appeal's Fifth District
wrote in an unpublished opinion that Miller expands the need to consider
the chief factors of adolescence, even though Miller does not directly
impact California's sentencing scheme.
This decision was partly
premised on the notion, advanced in Miller, that the insufficient maturity of
youth could disrupt the fairness of a juvenile's sentencing.
When the Governor of Iowa commuted the sentences of all state prison
inmates who committed first-degree murder as minors to a mandatory sixty
years, some in the juvenile justice community wondered whether these
sixty-year sentences could be distinguished from life sentences. Yet the
implementation of this commutation scheme in Iowa could also be
invalidated because it declines to give an individualized hearing, as Miller
requires.79
the crime).
73. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.5(b) (West 2012) (conveying that the sentencing
official was not mandated to impose such a sentence on juveniles convicted of firstdegree murder).
74. See Daugherty, 96 So. 3d at 1080 (holding that upon remand, the trial court
must consider whether any of attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications
of the original sentence).
75. See id. (observing that the trial court had already considered the defendant's
"horrible and unfortunate upbringing").
76. See People v. Hoffman, No. FO61127, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5574, at
*9 (Cal. Ct. App. July 30, 2012) (contending that Miller renders an assessment of
traditional mitigating factors incomplete in regards to juveniles).
77. See id. at *10 (indicating that a juvenile's inability to deal with law
enforcement or incapacity to assist with legal counsel could put the juvenile at a
disadvantage in court).
78. See Office of the Governor of Iowa, BranstadMoves to Prevent the Release of
DangerousMurderers in Light ofRecent U.S. Supreme CourtDecision (July 16, 2012),
available at https://governor.iowa.gov/2012/07/branstad-moves-to-prevent-the-releaseof-dangerous-murderers-in-light-of-recent-u-s-supreme-court-decision (remarking that
these offenders will not have the possibility of parole until they serve sixty years).
79. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2470 (2012) (outlining the penological
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III. ANALYSIS

A. In the Context of the Eighth Amendment, Miller Should Be Applied
Broadly to ProhibitAll MandatoryJuvenile Life- Without-ParoleCases,
Regardless of Whether the Punishment Is Strictly Constructed.
The Miller court makes clear that its decision will require a change in the
sentencing structure of twenty-nine states to eliminate the strict and
mandatory imposition of an LWOP sentence on a juvenile.8 0 Yet this
holding warrants an expansive change in all states because juvenile
offenders can still face LWOP sentences in a mandatory imposition.
Should the Miller decision only apply to the twenty-nine jurisdictions that
previously enforced the prohibited punishment, LWOP sentences could still
be mandatorily assigned to juveniles in less obvious pathways.82
LWOP sentence is the second-most severe penalty that is possible in the
United States justice system, and the imposition of such a punishment in
defiance of the Supreme Court's recent holdings is a grave matter.8 3 A
court's decision to permit the imposition of these ambiguously defined
LWOP sentences fails to reflect the proper consideration of adolescent
psychology and diminished juvenile culpability that the Court used to
advance its holding in Miller.84
1. A Narrow Interpretationof Miller Will Result in States Sentencing
Juveniles to MandatoryLife- Without-Parole Sentences ProducedFrom a
Combinationof Convictions CarryingMandatoryMinimum Terms.
A sentencing scheme that allocates a mandatory minimum punishment to
a juvenile offender for each count or separate crime can circumvent
Miller's prohibition against mandatory LWOP sentences because such a
reasons under which a mandatory juvenile LWOP sentence is unconstitutional).
80. See id. at 2482 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that this holding's impact will
be especially significant because it will alter the sentencing schemes of so many
jurisdictions).
81. See People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012) (implying that a
combination of minimum charges for crimes can create a mandatory life sentence, even
though the defendant did not kill anyone).
82. See id. at 298 (stating that such a sentence could be mandatory by dispensing
multiple terms amounting to a functional life sentence).
83. See People v. Hoffman, No. F061127, 2012 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 5574, at
*5 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. July 30, 2012) (framing an LWOP punishment as the secondmost severe penalty behind, logically, the death penalty).
84. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (concluding that the decision is based on the idea
that adolescent culpability must be considered when administering such a strict
punishment).
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sentence will be decided without a judge or jury first contemplating the
juvenile defendant's youthful attributes.8 5 Because Miller holds that the
mitigating factors of a juvenile offender's youth must be considered before
the imposition of an LWOP sentence, the mandatory nature of a set of
concurring terms-of-years sentences deprives minor offenders the requisite
consideration of their circumstances.86
Exempting the states that lack mandatory LWOP sentences from the
narrow application of Miller's holding could also result in sentences that
run afoul of the concerns over proportionality that are central to Graham
and Miller.87 A juvenile offender will not have his culpability properly
assessed if he is sentenced to a mandatory life punishment without first
having his distinctive attributes of youth taken into account.88 A sentencing
scheme that combines multiple mandatory terms-of-years sentences to
punish a juvenile offender could result in a sentence so disproportionately
harsh that it violates the standards of the Eighth Amendment set forth in
Miller's prohibition on mandatorily imposing such a sentence upon a
juvenile.89
In Bunch v. State, a case decided less than two weeks after Miller, the
Sixth Circuit raised concerns that courts may employ a literal interpretation
of a life sentence and limit Miller's holding only to strictly juvenile LWOP
sentences. 90 The court in Bunch, perhaps because of the decision's timing,
only offered a marginal assessment of Miller.91 The Bunch court's

85. See Caballero, 282 P.3d at 295 (noting that although Graham prohibits
imposing LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes, an aggregation of shorter
sentences could effectively amount to a life sentence).
86. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (asserting that such punishments require that the
judge or jury have the opportunity to examine any mitigating aspects of youth).
87. See id. at 2466 (contending that mandatory sentencing schemes that fail to
consider a juvenile's youth can disproportionately punish a juvenile because youth can
reduce culpability); see also Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010)
(maintaining that the penological differences between punishing adults and punishing
children render juvenile LWOP sentences disproportionate and in violation of the
Eighth Amendment).
88. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026-27) (holding
that when a mandatory sentence is imposed on a juvenile, the juvenile's lessened
culpability and greater capacity for change are not contemplated).
89. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (observing that when examining life sentences,
a juvenile on average will serve more years and a greater percentage of his life than an
adult offender would in a life sentence).
90. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that Miller's
focus on life sentences represented a difference between punishments derived from
consecutive fixed-term sentences).
91. See id. (observing that a description or mention of Miller does not occur until

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss1/12

14

Nostro: The Importance of an Expansive Deference to Miller v. Alabama

2013]

THE IMPORTANCE OF AN EXPANSIVE DEFERENCE

181

continuous dependence on Graham's construction of strict sentencing
schemes results in a holding that fails to contemplate the decision's
penological justifications and juvenile justice implications.92
I
distinguishing the imposition of consecutive fixed-term sentences from a
standard LWOP punishment, Bunch depends on the structure of the
punishment without assessing the merits of why the Court in Graham and
Miller ruled against juvenile LWOP.93
Despite Graham's thorough breakdown of why juvenile offenders'
immaturity and youthful characteristics should preclude them from LWOP
sentences for certain crimes, and Miller's requirement that judges consider
a juvenile's youth, the court in Bunch chooses to focus on a technical
quandary that ignored Miller's holding on juvenile culpability.94 The
Bunch holding ignores Miller's analytical foundations, such as its finding
that "the Eighth Amendment forbids a sentencing scheme that mandates
life in prison without possibility of parole for juvenile offenders."" The
majority in Miller frames its holding as one that will restrict courts from
mandatorily "imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles." The
Bunch holding illustrates the reckless danger of a strict interpretation of
Miller.9 7 In Bunch, the Sixth Circuit's adherence to Miller was a sham; it
could not have perceived an eighty-nine-year prison sentence without
parole to be any different from an LWOP sentence.98 A punishment that
effectively incarcerates a juvenile offender for life cannot be deemed to be
proportionate when it is imposed without considering mitigating

the final paragraph of the Bunch opinion).
92. See id. at 552 (attributing the Graham Court's failure to discuss functional life
sentences as evidence that the decision must only apply to strict single-sentence LWOP
penalties).
93. See id. (concluding that because Graham did not even consider consecutive
fixed-term life sentences, it could not apply to this case).
94. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012) (requiring a juvenile's
youth to be considered before an LWOP punishment in order to assess the
proportionality of a sentence); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032 (holding that the immaturity
of youth can weaken the actual culpability of a juvenile offender); Bunch, 685 F.3d at
552 (detailing juvenile offenders' consecutive fixed-term sentences).
95. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (holding that the mandatory sentencing of a
juvenile under such a scheme makes youth an irrelevant factor in the sentencing).
96. See id. at 2475 (declaring that to impose such a sentence without considering a
juvenile's mitigating youthful attributes is a violation of the Eighth Amendment).
97. See Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (noting that the juvenile defendant's sentence will
still effectively result in an LWOP sentence).
98. See id. (holding that a punishment derived from multiple convictions is
different from a single-conviction sentence).
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circumstances of that juvenile's youthfulness. 99
When Florida's Second District Court of Appeals upheld a functional
life sentence that punished a thirteen-year-old with ninety-two years in
prison, the court argued that the Miller decision could not apply because
the offender had been sentenced for committing several crimes in separate
incidents. 00 The court in Walle v. State similarly erred in reaching its
understanding that Miller would allow such a sentencing scheme because
the punishment is proportioned to each individual crime.101
This
contradicts the Miller holding, which held that proportionality of the
sentencing should be attuned not only to a juvenile offender's crime, but to
the offender's background as well.102
The Florida court only took note of whether the punishment was
proportional to the crime. Although the crimes were horrific and
exceedingly severe, the court failed to consider the offender's youth and
the related circumstances properly. 03 Because the Miller Court did not
categorically ban juvenile LWOP sentences and merely required a presentencing consideration of the juvenile's youth, the Florida court
erroneously interpreted Miller by failing to take the offender's diminished
culpability into account for sentencing.10 4 Instead, the construction of
consecutive mandatory termed-sentences ignores consideration of the
offender's youth in a clear repudiation of Miller.0 5

99. Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (prohibiting mandatory juvenile LWOP
sentences that are imposed without first considering the offender's youthful
circumstances), with Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (outlining the mandatory composition of
the offender's punishment).
100. See Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining
that each conviction warranted a proportionate sentence based on the severity of that
offense).
101. See id. (arguing that Miller's Eighth Amendment analysis required punishments
to be determined by the severity of each crime).
102. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463 (explaining that under the Eighth Amendment, an
offender's punishment must be proportionate to the offender and the specific crime).
103. See Walle, 99 So. 3d at 972 (failing to discuss why an offender's punishment
should be upheld without regard to his youth). Contra Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466
(reasoning that a mandatory LWOP sentence imposed on a juvenile fails to assess
whether the juvenile's sentence proportionately punishes the offender).
104. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (framing the central issue of Miller, Roper, and
Graham as the necessity of processing juveniles differently when sentencing them to
the most severe of penalties).
105. See id. (explaining that a mandatory sentence removes any mitigating effects of
youth because it is automatically imposed without discretion).
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2. Precludingthe Application ofMiller in Specific States Would Allow for
the UnrestrainedImposition ofLong Punishments That Fail to Grant a
Meaningfid Opportunityfor Release on Minors.
Exceedingly long sentences that do not allow for parole and are the
functional equivalent of life sentences cannot be mandatorily imposed on
juveniles in light of Miller's requirement that courts consider the attributes
of the offender's youth before imposing an LWOP sentence.106 These
sentences, which could be structured from a combination of mandatory
minimum punishments for specific counts, would still be the functional
equivalent of a mandatory LWOP sentence. 0 7 The commutation of an
LWOP sentence that was mandatorily imposed on a juvenile to instead
consist of a mandatory sixty-year sentence before the possibility of parole
would still conflict with Miller because it would fail to consider the
offender's youth, and it would not allow for a realistic opportunity of
parole. 108 The Iowa commutation would not allow for the consideration of
the mitigating aspects of a juvenile's age, nor would it offer juveniles a
realistic opportunity at release. 0 9 Allowing the Iowa scheme to go forward
sets a dangerous precedent that weakens the impact of Miller."0 The
proliferation of disproportionately harsh mandatory sentences that fail to
consider a juvenile's mitigating circumstances of youth could occur in
states that did not previously enforce mandatory LWOP sentences on
juveniles, creating an argument for a uniform deference to Miller."'

106. See id. at 2469 (criticizing the failure to consider a juvenile offender's
adolescent mental features as risking a disproportionately harsh sentence).
107. See State v. Solis-Diaz, No. 37120-I-I, 2009 WL 3261249, at *2-3 (Wash. Ct.
App. Oct. 13, 2009) (noting that the defendant's ninety-two-year sentence resulted
from his conviction on eight counts).
108. Compare Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (holding that before such a punishment is
imposed on a juvenile, the sentencing official must consider the mitigating
circumstances of youth), with People v. Caballero, 282 P.3d 291, 295 (Cal. 2012)
(holding that a 110-year sentence fails to provide the offender with a realistic
opportunity to obtain a release from prison).
109. See Caballero,282 P.3d at 295 (holding that a sentence of 110 years would not
allow the defendant the opportunity to demonstrate growth and maturity).
110. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (requiring a consideration of a juvenile's
adolescent-related culpability in advance of a mandatory sentence).
111. See id. at 2469 (holding that the sentencing official is required to consider how
children are different when considering an LWOP sentence).
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B. To Satisfy the Supreme Court's ConstitutionalStandards, the Restriction
of a Punishment Should Fit Within a National Consensus, andIt Must Stem
From Court Precedent.
An implementation of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
analytical framework of identifying a national consensus against a
punishment and assessing Court precedent demonstrates that the Court's
decision in Miller must be construed broadly to restrict all juvenile LWOP
sentences.112 Because the Miller court did not seek to implement a
categorical ban on juvenile LWOP punishments, an Eighth Amendment
analysis of whether a sentence adheres to the decision requires a different
framework than that employed in Roper and Graham."3 If a court
ascertains a national consensus against the use of mandatory juvenile
LWOP sentences, that consensus provides justification for applying
Miller's holding broadly to all mandatory juvenile LWOP sentences. 1 14
The uneven distribution of juvenile LWOP sentences across the states
connotes the lack of a national consensus against mandatory juvenile
LWOP."s Although the Court has been careful to characterize its desire
for a national consensus as merely a preference, a finding of common
precedent would certainly strengthen the argument in favor of a broader
expansion of Miller."6 For Miller to be extended, the Court's finding
would have to stem from previous precedent, rather than the Court's
independent judgment."' 7 Because the Court's precedent articulates the
priority of exempting juveniles from a mandatory punishment more than it
advocates against a specific sentencing scheme, the Miller holding should
112. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (asserting that the Court's precedent supplants
the need for an independent judgment in this case); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011,

2015 (2010) (explaining the requirement of a national consensus against a punishment
for it to be found unconstitutional).
113. Compare Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2015 (outlining that a punishment is
unconstitutional when a court shows a national consensus but relies on its independent
judgment), with Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (explaining that because the decision only
mandates that a sentencing official follow a process, the Court does not need to apply
its independent judgment).
114. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (illustrating how a national consensus against a
sentence for a particular class of offenders could be used to hold a punishment
unconstitutional).
115. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 56 (noting that Pennsylvania alone had
mandatorily imposed such a sentence on 444 juvenile offenders).
116. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469-70 (noting that even though the majority
acknowledges that a showing of a national consensus is not necessary, it seeks to prove
one).
117. See id. at 2471 (clarifying that because the Court is not proposing a categorical
ban, the decision must only flow straightforwardly from Court precedent).
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not be limited to strict LWOP sentences." 8
1. A Findingof a National ConsensusAgainst Excessive Punishmentsof
Juveniles Warrants an Extension of Miller to Encompass All Mandatory
Life-Without-ParoleSituations.

When considering whether a punishment is constitutional under the
Eighth Amendment, the punishment must be considered against "the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.""' 9 In assessing the constitutionality of a juvenile sentencing
practice, the Court has examined state-by-state sentencing practices to
identify any national consensus in reference to a punishment.120 To gauge
whether Miller's holding prohibits states from enforcing any sentencing
scheme that results in the mandatory imposition of an LWOP punishment
on a juvenile, a national consensus requires courts to construe Miller to
forbid any scenario in which a juvenile offender receives a mandatory

LWOP sentence. 12 1
Although the Court in Miller could not attribute its decision to a clear
national consensus for the prohibition of mandatory juvenile LWOP, there
is no consensus providing a definitive stance against a prohibition of
mandatory juvenile LWOP sentencing.12 2 Instead of assessing the number
of states that employ strict mandatory LWOP sentences on juvenile
offenders, the Court has previously identified a national consensus by
looking at actual sentencing practices within each state rather than solely in
identifying whether a punishment is permitted in a majority of
118. See id. at 2465-66 (construing the role a minor's maturity plays in his
culpability as supporting the notion that failing to consider this role results in
disproportionate punishments). But see Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 973 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2012) (arguing that an LWOP sentence for a juvenile is proportional if the
juvenile commits multiple severe offenses that warrant severe penalties).
119. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 561 (2005) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958)) (describing the Court's method of determining whether a

punishment fits within the purpose of the constitutional design).
120. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023 (2010) (explaining that the
consensus against non-homicide juvenile LWOP is more evident in the scarcity of
actual sentences than its statutory permission in most states); Roper, 543 U.S. at 564-65
(identifying a consensus based on the fact that of the twenty states whose laws allow
for the juvenile death penalty, only three states had executed a minor in the previous
ten years).
121. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (separating Miller from past cases that required a
national consensus but still attempting to identify a national consensus to strengthen the
argument).
122. See id. (acknowledging that the majority of states had statutory schemes that
allowed mandatory juvenile LWOP).
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jurisdictions.12 3 The mandatory nature of this sort of punishment clouds the
analysis of whether a national consensus exists by resulting in sentencing
numbers that failed to take into account any discretion in their
sentencing.124 In Miller, the majority noted that because of this muddled
situation, a national consensus could instead be examined through the
sentencing practices in states where juvenile LWOP is sanctioned but not
mandatory. 125 This allows for a more genuine inspection of the national
attitude toward imposing LWOP sentences on juveniles.126 Human Rights
Watch's assessment of the national distribution of juvenile offenders
illustrates that of the twenty-seven states that mandatorily imposed LWOP
sentences on juveniles, each state, on average, had sentenced more than
sixty-three juveniles with LWOP punishments.127
This discrepancy in the sentencing numbers between states that
mandatorily impose LWOP on juveniles and states that merely have the
discretion to enforce such a punishment represents a strong aversion to the
concept of sending minors to prison for life.12 8 More than half of all
juvenile offenders serving an LWOP punishment are clustered in four
states, and the relatively low number of juveniles that were dealt LWOP
punishments in the discretionary states demonstrates a national consensus
against schemes that deprive juveniles of a meaningful opportunity for
release.12 9 That many states are apparently so hesitant to sentence minors
123. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2024 (maintaining that a national consensus was
derived from the scarcity of juveniles serving LWOP for non-homicide crimes because
the majority of such inmates were in one state alone); Roper, 543 U.S. at 567
(associating the lack of instances in which the punishment was imposed with an overall
movement away from the death penalty).
124. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467 (observing the automatic triggering of a
mandatory LWOP sentence fails to allow any discretion in its application).
125. See id. at 2472 (contending that the actual numbers of instances of juvenile
LWOP throughout the states is more valuable than the total amount of states that
sanction it).
126. See id. at 2472 n.10 (explaining that these instances in which discretion exists
demonstrate the sentencing official's resistance to imposing LWOP on juveniles).
127. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 56 (noting that Louisiana, Michigan,
and Pennsylvania had each mandatorily imposed such a sentence on more than 300
juvenile offenders).
128. See id. (characterizing the statistics that demonstrate a hesitancy to impose
LWOP on juveniles as proof that sentencing officials consider this punishment to be an
unattractive last resort).
129. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (contending that isolating the discretionary
juvenile LWOP states is a more valuable exercise for comprehending the national
consensus); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 56 (noting that Florida, Louisiana,
Michigan, and Pennsylvania account for more than half of the incarcerated juvenile
LWOP offenders).
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to life in prison is in accordance with a general reluctance to mandatorily
impose LWOP sentences, or sentences approaching a life term, on juvenile
offenders irrespective of whether the sentence was clearly labeled as an
LWOP punishment or whether the punishment instead was derived from
multiple terms-of-years sentences.1 3 0
2. An Analysis ofRelevant Supreme Court PrecedentDoes Not ProduceA
Precept That WouldAllow for the Imposition of MandatoryLife- WithoutParolePunishments Upon Juvenile Offenders.
When analyzing whether a punishment violates the Eighth Amendment,
the Supreme Court customarily relies in part on its independent
judgment.' 3 As the majority in Miller noted, when a categorical ban on a
punishment is not at issue, the court must instead look to Supreme Court
precedent to determine whether a sentencing practice is consistent with the
The Court's most relevant cases portray a
Eighth Amendment. 32
conclusion that the constitutionality of the punishment is determined by the
degree of the culpability of the offender-the more culpable the offender,
the more likely the punishment is constitutional.'
In contextualizing the development of the Court's position on juvenile
punishments and the Eighth Amendment, Roper is critical to determining
whether Miller should be extended to situations in which a juvenile
offender faces a mandatory imposition of a sentence that is functionally
LWOP.134 The Roper Court reasons that a juvenile offender's youth can be
overshadowed in certain cases because of the brutality of a specific crime, a
consideration that could be extended in the aftermath of Miller.135 That
130. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2472 n.10 (assessing this reluctance to impose LWOP
on juveniles as proof of a preference for juvenile proportionality based on the
mitigating qualities of youth).
131. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010) (asserting that the Court
had the right and responsibility of independently interpreting the Eighth Amendment,
in addition to gauging the national consensus).
132. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471 (explaining that because a categorical ban was
not sought, the decision would have to flow from Supreme Court precedent).
133. See id. at 2465 (discussing the emphasis in Roper and Graham on how the
attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for severe penalties on
juvenile offenders); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 552 (2005) (recounting the
importance of equating a punishment to an offender's culpability, especially in juvenile
cases).
134. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (holding that juveniles should be entitled to
greater leniency because the circumstances of youth do not align with the penological
justifications for the death penalty).
135. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 573 (recounting that the prosecutor against the
defendant Simmons in the lower court cited the defendant's youth as an aggravating
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such a concern was expressed in Roper would support extending the Miller
holding to include all instances of juveniles facing mandatory functional
LWOP sentences, and not just those that are strictly labeled LWOP.13 6
The holding in Graham also suggests that Miller is construed so as to
apply to all juvenile LWOP scenarios. The Court again makes its decision
with the intention of upholding the penological justifications for applying
legislation to a class of criminals.137 Through emphasizing the lack of any
retributive qualities in capital punishments, the majority in Graham
contends that the lack of a retributive foundation in LWOP sentences is not
appropriate for the less culpable juvenile offender.'3 8 This retributive
argument, which the Graham Court adapted from Roper, can also extend to
Miller's holding.139 Because Miller removed the possibility of a mandatory
single-offense LWOP sentence for juveniles, it follows from Graham's
retributive discussion that the severity of a mandatory LWOP punishment
cannot be justified with any retributive qualification because of the
diminished culpability of juvenile offenders.14 0
Graham additionally held that the justifications of deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation are insufficient to warrant sentencing
juveniles to LWOP in non-homicide crimes.141 In following the logic by
which Graham questioned a sentencing official's ability to conclude that a
juvenile offender would forever be dangerous, a strict interpretation of
Miller will result in penalties that will mandatorily remove juveniles from
society for the rest of their lives.1 42 Graham's holding advances the idea
factor, rather than a mitigating factor).
136. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (outlining the reasons for which the consideration
of youth can strengthen the proportionality of a punishment).
137. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (noting that the Court
proceeds to distinguish defendants that are less deserving of punishments because of
their age or mental deficiency).
138. See id at 2028 (explaining that an LWOP sentence does not directly correlate to
the diminished personal culpability ofjuvenile offenders).
139. See id (arguing that a retributive punishment cannot be justified when it is
disproportionately harsh).
140. See id. at 2030 (discussing the manner in which parole can allow juvenile
offenders the opportunity to gain eventual release and realize the rehabilitative aspect
of their punishment).
141. See id. at 2028-29 (asserting that juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence
because of their immaturity, and that the incapacitation justification rests on a shaky
assumption).
142. See id at 2029 (explaining that an LWOP penalty is predicated on the belief
that an offender must be removed from society for life); see also Miller v. Alabama,
132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (holding that a sentencing scheme that mandatorily
imposes an LWOP punishment on a juvenile is unconstitutional).
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that a juvenile offender is different from an adult offender, and the
rationalization for incarcerating a minor for life would require an
incapacitation and rehabilitation justification that cannot be linked to the
general diminished culpability of juveniles.14 3
If the Miller decision is structured only to encompass minors that receive
strictly-defined single sentence LWOP punishments, then sentences that are
the functional equivalent of juvenile LWOP sentences will not adhere to
the incapacitation and rehabilitation justifications that the Court recently
advocated.'" To mandatorily sentence a juvenile offender to the functional
equivalent of an LWOP sentence based on concurring punishments for a
non-homicide crime violates the Eighth Amendment because such a
punishment would be devoid of the penological justifications that were
recognized in Graham.'45 An LWOP punishment would fail to provide any
rehabilitation for the offender; valuable prison classes and programs are
often not offered to inmates serving life sentences and, as the Graham court
contended, such a punishment would still not deter juveniles because they
often lack the requisite cognitive maturity.14 6 A mandatory juvenile LWOP
punishment satisfies the incapacitation theory of punishment in that it
permanently removes a criminal from society; yet incapacitation cannot
justify such a mandatorily imposed punishment because the juvenile's
immaturities would make it difficult for a sentencing official to conclude
that a juvenile would forever be a danger to society. 14 7
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

A sentencing scheme that fails to consider a juvenile offender's potential
143. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029-30 (maintaining that juvenile LWOP sentences
lack incapacitation and rehabilitative justifications because they make a final ruling that
the offender has no value in society).
144. Compare id. at 2030 (noting that penalties that permanently deny criminals the
opportunity to re-enter society must match the offenders' culpability), with Miller, 132
S. Ct. at 2466 (articulating the need to consider an offender's youth to ensure a
proportionate punishment).
145. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465 (concluding that the penological theories fail to
justify imposing juvenile LWOP sentences for non-homicide crimes).
146. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (reasoning that punishments that restrict
offenders from returning to society effectively establish that the offender cannot be
rehabilitated); ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE
23 (2012), available at
SURVEY
LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/jj_The Lives of JuvenileLifers.pdf
(reporting that more than sixty percent of juvenile offenders serving LWOP sentences
are not engaged in rehabilitative programming).
147. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2029 (discussing the difficulty of assessing a
juvenile offender's incorrigibility in light of a juvenile's immature characteristics).
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for rehabilitation is at odds with the Supreme Court's stance on juvenile
culpability. 14 8 A narrow interpretation of the Court's holding in Miller
would result in troubling sentencing inconsistencies and a failure to provide
systematic proportionality for juveniles.
State legislatures should
incorporate Graham and the expanded interpretation of Miller to ban all
juvenile LWOP sentences. This would permit states to impose life
sentences on the minor offenders who commit the most heinous of crimes,
but allowing the opportunity of parole would shift the responsibility of
assessing a criminal's rehabilitation to a parole board to better evaluate the
effects of incarceration.149
The critical implication of foregoing a narrow interpretation of Miller is
the likelihood that individual states will end up enforcing conflicting
punishments. so A cohesive adjustment to the interpretation of Miller will
prevent the sentencing system from being rife with inconsistencies. 51 A
lower court's technical construction of the concept of a life sentence could
lead to a peculiar dilemma: a minor convicted of a murder and facing a
single LWOP sentence must first have his youth and mitigating
circumstances assessed, but a minor facing mandatory punishments for
multiple crimes totaling a functional life sentence will not have his youth
contemplated first.15 2 This inconsistency will result in disproportionately
harsh juvenile sentences that are at odds with the Eighth Amendment.15 3
To eradicate any concerns that Miller will be unevenly enforced at the
expense of juvenile justice, the states should discontinue imposing LWOP
sentences on minors. Twelve states forbid juvenile LWOP sentences, and
those that do so without exceptions should serve as a foundational blueprint
148. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (concluding that the mitigating circumstances of
a juvenile's youth must be considered before the imposition of an LWOP sentences so
as to maintain the punishment's proportionality).
149. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (noting that the LWOP sentences can often fail
to satisfy the penological goals of retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and
rehabilitation).
150. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (arguing that Miller did
not prevent a mandatory eighty-nine-year sentence); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469
(holding mandatory LWOP sentences to be unconstitutional).
151. See Walle v. State, 99 So. 3d 967, 967 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that
Miller's ban on mandatory LWOP punishments does not apply when the punishment
consists of separate convictions).
152. E.g., Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552-53 (concluding that because Graham and Miller
did not consider consecutive fixed-term life sentences, those decisions could not apply
to a multiple term eighty-nine year sentence).
153. See id. at 553 (punishing a defendant who did not commit murder to a
mandatory eighty-nine-year sentence); see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (prohibiting
mandatory LWOP sentences for minors).
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for other states to follow.154 The most severe penalty in New Mexico, for
instance, is life imprisonment, yet all offenders serving life are eligible for
a parole hearing after thirty years of incarceration.' 5 5 If the provisions of
the New Mexico statute are adopted specifically for juvenile offenders,
states would be able to shift the discretion and final judgment of a minor's
culpability to the parole board at a later date.
An ideal state provision would also clearly prohibit sentences derived
from multiple charges totaling a term sentence approaching life
imprisonment. The mandatory inclusion of parole in juvenile life sentences
will ultimately prevent the types of punishments of LWOP that can
occur.156 A restriction of all LWOP sentences, including sentences that
incarcerate minors for a period of time surpassing the average life
expectancy, prohibits judges from shunning the mitigating circumstances of
youth that Miller requires them to contemplate.157
The logical extension of the holdings of Graham and Miller is the
prohibition of all juvenile LWOP punishments.'5 8 Whereas Graham
limited LWOP punishments only to juveniles convicted for homicides, and
Miller prohibited the imposition of mandatory LWOP sentences on
juveniles, an elimination of all juvenile LWOP punishments will continue
to treat juvenile offenders differently though it will require the parole board
to make a final decision on the youth's culpability.159
The advantages of a uniform ban of juvenile LWOP will also alleviate
the practical difficulties of providing legal representation to youth.16 0 Such
a restriction would preclude minors from life incarceration resulting from a
difficulty in assisting their own attorneys, or communication problems with
154. See State-by-State Legal Resource Guide, UNIV. OF S.F. SCH. OF LAW,
http://www.usfca.edullaw/jlwop/resource-guide (providing each state's statutory
position on juvenile LWOP sentencing).
155. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-21-10 (2012) (including minors in the ban on
LWOP sentences and the requirement for parole eligibility, once an offender serves
thirty years in prison).
156. E.g., State v. Solis-Diaz, 152 Wash. App. 1038, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(describing the production of a 1,111-month sentence based on multiple non-murder
convictions).
157. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465-66 (2012) (holding that a judge's
failure to consider a juvenile offender's youth deprives the sentencing official of the
opportunity to consider whether the offender's punishment is proportional).
158. See id. at 2489-90 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the recent line

of cases may soon result in the Court prohibiting all juvenile LWOP sentences).
159. See id at 2478 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (articulating the impact of a nondiscretionary sentence that does not allow for parole).
160. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (describing the extent to
which juvenile offenders have difficulty in criminal proceedings).
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law enforcement.' 6 ' Shifting the ultimate discretion of a juvenile's
culpability to a point later in the offender's life would alleviate the effects
of general juvenile mistrust of adults and would allow adults to defend
themselves for crimes they committed as minors.16 2
V. CONCLUSION

The ramifications of a literal interpretation of the type of life sentence
Miller specifically referred to would lead to a justice system that continues
to mandatorily incarcerate juveniles for life without first contemplating any
mitigating circumstances of their youth. 63 The adolescent culpability
standards that the Court advanced in Roper, Graham, and Miller are
completely disregarded when a lower court mandatorily sentences a
juvenile to a punishment that is effectively for life without the opportunity
of parole.1 64 Should Miller be interpreted to encompass all forms of
mandatory punishments that incarcerate juvenile criminals beyond their life
expectancy, then Miller's ultimate decision will be properly integrated and
this prohibition will reflect the Supreme Court's recent considerations of
adolescent culpability and juvenile justice.

161. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468 (noting that the majority references the
disadvantages juveniles face in court).
162. See id (noting that juvenile defendants have difficulty with certain aspects of
the legal process); Graham, 560 U.S. at 2032 (outlining the manner in which the
impulsive and rebellious qualities of youth can lead to juvenile offenders impairing
their own legal defense).
163. See Bunch v. Smith, 685 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2012) (arguing that Miller did
not prevent a mandatory eighty-nine-year sentence because that punishment derived
from separate consecutive sentences).
164. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2034 (holding that juveniles could not be sentenced
to life-without-parole for non-homicide crimes); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
578-79 (2005) (holding that sentencing juveniles to death was unconstitutional); see
also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470 (holding that a judge's failure to consider a juvenile
offender's youth deprives the sentencing official of the opportunity to consider whether
the punishment is proportional). Contra Bunch, 685 F.3d at 552 (holding that the
proportionality of a juvenile's crime does not outweigh the Supreme Court's omission
of certain sentencing schemes from its analysis in Miller).
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